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In the Suprem.e Court of the 
State of lJtah 
LEAH C. JONES; MARTHA 
C. WHITING and LEAH·, C. 
BEETON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MARK B. COOK, 




STATEMEN~ OF FACTS 
Appellants' "Statement of the Case" contains various 
items of argument which \Ve shall not undertake to correct 
until we come to the division devoted to argument in this 
brief. Exception further must be taken because it does 
not set out a number of the important facts which are es-
tablished by the record, and to which we will call attention 
in this statement. It also recites as "facts" testimony which, 
although appearing in the record, is controverted by other 
preponderating testimony. In other words, while there is 
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some evidence to support much of the statement presented 
by appellants, yet as to several of the facts claimed, other 
evidence preponderates. The court found against appel-
lants, afld in view 6f this, we aTe noting below facts con-
·trary to those cited by appellants or in explanation of them, 
which we believe are supported by the preponderance of 
the evidence and whiCh .ba¥e .been .,ccmfirmed by the find-
ings of the court. 
With respect to pleadings, in addition to the denial of 
respondent's ownership of the .automobile and the .other 
matters mentioned in appellants' statement, the answer Qf 
defendant alleges fully the personal and other notices given 
to the plaintiffs of the probate proceedings (JR 8-9) and 
the personal knowledge of the plaintiffs concerning defend-
ant's claims to, and possession of, the autotnobile (JR 10). 
Appellants claim on page 4 of their brief that "they 
(the plaintiffs) also admit that Mark B. Cook, the defend-
ant, during the time he was acting as executor, had posses-
sion of the automobile as by. law permitted; that Irene B. 
Cook held a life estat.e in said aut'Dmobile tmtil the date of 
her death." By this, it seems to_ be inferred that the de-
fendant alleged that during the time he was acting as ex-
ecutor he had possession of the automobile as by law per-
mitted and alleged that Irene B. ,Cook held a life estate in 
said automobile. This _is contrary to the facts, since Mark 
B .. CookJ at all times, both in his pleadings, in his testimony 
and by his conduct and otherwise, claimed and took the po-
sition that he had possession of the automobile under a 
personal claim of right and that neither Irene B. Cook nor 
the plaintiffs had any interest in the automobile (JR 10-11). 
Leah C. Jones., one .of the plaintiffs, testified that she 
was interested in keeping track of the car even before her 
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father"s death (Tr 11) and she knew that the defendant 
was using the car whenever he \Vanted to (Tr 13). The 
plaintiffs first decided in February of 1945 that there was 
a question in their minds as to whom the car belonged (Tr 
13) and apparently had in mind making a claim as early as 
February, 1945, but the date a claim for the car was com-· 
municated by the plaintiffs was in May, 1948, when plain-
tiffs' attorney made a demand (Tr 14). 
The defendant was the only one that had any posses-
sion of the car after the father's death as far as the plain-
tiff, Leah C. Jones, knew (Tr 14). The three plaintiffs and 
Irene B. Cook were present in court when the estate of their 
father \Vas ordered distributed and they made no objections 
to the distribution (Tr 15). They knew that there was a 
decree of distribution and that it was sent over to their 
mother's place and the \vitness, Jones, saw it at least after_ 
her mother's death. The \vitness also knew Mark went on 
} 
using the car (Tr 15) ._ 
Although the plaintiff, Jones, had taken an interest in 
the car before she \Vas appointed administratrix of her moth-
er's estate, she at no time said anything to Mark. She knew 
IY.Iark had gotten the license plates to the car in 1945 (Tr 
16-17). She stated that the question of taxes didn't concern 
her in 1945. Although it was uncontradicted that Mark 
had paid all taxes, she stated that all that concerned her was 
who owned the car (Tr 16). She knew that no one else 
had the possession of -the car excepting the defendant and 
perhaps his wife, sometimes (Tr 17) . She said she didn't 
think that the hearing of the appraising of the estate was 
the time to make any objections (Tr 17). 
While there was a policy of insurance issued to Irene 
B. Cook in June, 1944, this policy \vas issued in the absence 
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of the defendant, the agent telling Mrs. Cook that there had 
been a policy in May, 1943, which had lapsed and she was 
asked to renew it (Tr 38). This was in June, 1944, before 
Mark B. Cook was appointed executor. The insurance was 
not for damage to the car itself but was ·for public liability 
and property damage to others (Tr 39). 
The plaintiff, Martha C. Whiting, was also called as a 
witness, the third plaintiff not testifying. She admitted 
that none of the sisters were known to use the car either 
before or after her father's death; the mother, Irene B. 
Cook, asked Mark to let the car go up to Logan on a trip 
on which one of the plaintiffs' sons was to drive and Mark 
refused (Tr 46). This was about the 24th of July, 1944. 
The defendant at that time said he needed the car. While 
the witness stated that Mark kept the car at times in the 
garage of his mother's place, she admitted that he had other 
things in the garage belonging to him, among which it 
seemed to the witness, was a tractor (Tr 50). 
Mark B. Cook testified that he received the certificate 
of title to the car in question the first part of May, 1943 (Tr 
55) and had it in his possession ever since them (Tr 78). 
He denied that he later obtained the certificate from his 
mother as claimed by the witness, Leah C. Jones (Tr 79-
80). It should. be observed that the claim of plaintiffs that 
defendant actually received the certificate from pis mother 
rather than from his father is based on hearsay (Tr 115). 
After receiving the certificate, he had the car in his 
possession and claimed it as his own, and the first time he 
was ever notified that claim was made to the car, other 
than by himself, was in 1948, when the received a letter 
from plaintiffs' attorney (Tr 60). 
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It is apparent that the court, in view of his findings, 
believed Mark Cook. 
He also testified that his name was Mark B. Cbok and 
that he was also known as Mark Cook and Mark Cook, Jr., 
he further testified that his name was in the phone book 
as Mark Cook, Jr. (Tr 80). It thus was readily apparent 
why he did not consider it necessary to change the name on 
the certificate of title from Mark Cook. 
He further testified that the automobile was kept in 
his father's garage up to the winter of 1943-44, after which 
he kept it at his place and has never kept it at his mother's 
place since. He further testified that -he had had the car 
exclusively in his possession from 1943 (Tr 87). 
He was appointed executor of his father's estate in 
July, 1944. He first learned that his father had made a will 
after his mother had returned from Arizona and his mother 
returned in April, 1944 (Tr 88). It will thus be seen he had 
possession of, and claiiped, title to the car at least a year be-
fore he knew that his father had made a will He further 
testified that in the winter of 1943-44 the reason he kept 
the automobile at his father's garage was because heavy 
snow made it impractical to keep it at his home (Tr 89). 
He did not then have a garage himself, but fixed up one at 
the end of the winter and at all times after that, kept the 
car in his own garage (Tr 89) . 
, 
The defendant did not know about insurance when his 
mother took it out. When the policy was delivered to her, 
she told Mark she wanted to keep the insurance up so he 
wouldn't get into trouble. The defendant told her he would 
have to pay for it, but that he didn't want that kind of in-· 
surance as it was only liability insurance and wouldn't in-. 
elude collision insurance on the car; the defendant himself, 
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in June, 1945, took out full coverage (Tr 106). He paid his 
mother for the liability policy and took it home (Tr 104) a 
few days after it was delivered to her. 
Mrs. Mark B. Cook testified that she first saw the cer-
tificate to the car the day Mr. Cook gave it to the defend-
ant. His father had asked the son to take him for a ride, 
and on this ride, in the presence of Mrs. Cook, Mark and the 
witness, at a time when they were stopped at Deer Creek 
Dam, the father handed Mark the certificate of ownership 
and the extra set of keys to the car and stated, "I am giving 
it to you with the understanding that you take mother and 
I at any time when w~ want to go." (Tr 94). There was 
a set of keys in the car and he also gave Mark the extra set 
of keys ( Tr 95) . The witness further testified that Mr. 
Cook said, '·'I am giving you the car. I am giving you the 
car with the _understanding you take mother and I when 
we want to go." (Tr 100). 
Mark used the car almost every ~ay (Tr 103). 
Leah C. ·Jones on rebuttal admitted that in February, 
1945,·· before she had contacted her attorneys, she was 
watching the car and that the plaintiffs discussed the car 
between themselves and that her sisters and she discussed 
it and that her mother discussed the way things were go-
ing (Tr 117). She kne\V about these discussions when the 
final account and petition for distribution were heard (Tr 
117). 
She further testified that she k.new the car \Vas not in 
the inventory (Tr 126) and thereafter, she said she couldn't 
answer the question as to whether she knew it was not in 
the inventory; she said that they thought about the car but 
they didn't want to bring it up because their mother had 
ill health (Tr 127). She further testified, "We didn't want 
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trouble with ·Mark", and fw~ther said she thought the car 
belonged to them. She further testified that she didn't re-
call saying anything about the car to Mark (Tr 182); that 
they didn't say anything about it to Mark's attorney (Tr 
127) and that they didn't care to fuss about the car while 
their mother was alive (Tr 128). She further testified that 
while they wrote to the State Tax Commission in February, 
1945, they didn't say anything to Mark about the car "be-
cause it \Vouldn't have done any good. We knew from ex-
perience." (Tr 192). She further testified that she knew 
her mother went over and asked for the car so that the son 
of the witness could drive it to Logan and that Mark re-
fsed her (Tr 131). 
' There was received in evidence as defendant's Exhibit 
5 the inventory and appraisement in the estate of Mark 
Cook, deceased, and the certificate that the same contained 
a true statement of all of the es\ate of the said deceased 
which had come to the kno\vledge and possession of the 
executor (Tr 62). The inheritance tax report and appraise-
ment filed in the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was also 
received; this report and appraisement contained no refer-
ence to the automobile in question; also, the order prescrib-
ing notices of inheritance tax appraisement (Defendant's 
Exhibit 7) (Tr 63) and the notice of the hearing given by 
the tax appraisers (Defendant's Exhibit 8) and the proof 
of the service of notice upon each of the plaintiffs (Defend-
ant's Exhibit 9) (Tr 64, 72). 
Defendant's Exhibit 10, being proof of postin~ and mail-
ing notices of the hearing of the petition· of final distribu-
tion, was received in evidence, showing both posting as re-
quired by law and also service by mailing upon all of the 
plaintiffs, together with others (74-75). 
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The decree allowing and approving the final account 
in the matter of the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was re-
ceived in evidence. Since, in appellants' "Statement of the 
Case", they assume to interpret this decree by a fragmen-
tary reference to a recital concerning· ''unknown or undis-
covered property"', we are quoting in full the pertinent pro-
visions and stipulations made at the trial with respect there-
to: 
''Mark B. Cook, executor of the last will and testament 
of Mark Cook, deceased, having on the 6th day of AU-
gust, 1945, filed in this court the final account of said 
executor together with a petition for final distribution 
of the residue of the estate of said deceased, and said 
account and petition coming on regularly to be heard 
before the court the 18th day of August, A. D. 1945, 
and it having been made to appear to the court at said 
hearing that notice ther~f had been given for the time 
and in the manner ordered by the court and as pro-
.- vided by law, and the court having heard sworn evi-
dence on_ behalf of the petitioner in support of said pe-
tition, and it appearing therefrom to the satisfaction 
of the court that . due· and legal notice to the ereditors 
· of said decedent has been given for the time and in the 
manner required by law, and further, that a decree 
showing that such due and legal notice has been given, 
has heretofore been made· and filed herein as provided 
by law; and it further appearing from the evfdence that 
· all of the claims and . debts against the decedent and 
·against· his estate and all inheritance taxes due and 
payable and all property taxes payable by and or on 
·aceount of. said estate and· all debts, charges and expen-
ses of administrat~on have· been duly and fully paid 
and discharged, and that said estate is now in a condi-
tion to be cloSed. 
"IT IS, TI-IEREF10RE, HEREBY ORDiERED, AD-
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JUDGED AND DECREED: that the final account of 
said executor, Mark B. Cook, be and the same is hereby 
approved, allowed and settled, and that the residue of 
said estate of Mark Cook, deceased, as hereinafter par-
ticularly described, and any and all other property not 
· now known or discovered which may belong to said 
estate or in which said estate may have any interest 
be, and the same is hereby distributed in accordance 
with said last will and testament of said decedent and 
as hereinafter set out, to-wit: 
"To Irene B. Cook, surviving widow of said deceased, 
all of the estate and property of said deceased for her 
use and benefit during her natural life, with the re-
mainder or reversionary interest therein to be distribu-
ted as hereinafter specifically provided; said property 
above referred to and hereby· distributed is described 
as follows, to-wit: 
"And Judge, you want me to read all of the descriptions 
of the real estate? 
MR. CBRISTENSON: I don't think so. 
THE _COURT: It describes the property without 
the automobile? 
MR. HANSEN: I don't know about all of the 
property, probably not. We might read on this. There 
are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine-
there are nine tracts of land. 
MR. CHRISTENSON: There is no question about 
him having received the real estate, I take it, and it's 
been distributed? 
MR. HANSEN: The nine tracts of land described 
and then follows this: (Reading) 
"Water stocks. 1 share Mapleton Irrigation Co., cert. 
No. 506. 5lj2 shares Springville Irrigation Co., cert. 
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No. 171. 96 shares Big Hbllow Irrigation Co., cert. No. 
1 for 72 shares, cert~ No. 12 for 24 shares. 
''Farm machinery and equipment. Combine harvester, 
scraper, double disk, cultivator, horse, cow, calf. To-
gether with any and all other farm equipment and oth-
er property now upon or used in connection with said 
real property and belonging to said estate. 
"Househeld furniture belonging to said deceased. 
''To Mark B. Cook, son of said deceased, the reversion-
ary ~nterest in all of the above described real estate, 
· water stock and all farm machinery and equipment and 
livestock belonging to the estate or used in connection 
with said real estate, subject only to the life estate in 
Irene B. Cook, ·widow of said deceased; 
''To Leah C. Jones, Martha C. Whiting and Louise C. 
Beeton, daughters of said deceased, the -reversionary. 
interest in and to all of the rest, residue and remainder 
of the estate of said deceased, in equal undivided shares, 
subject however, to be _held by said Irene B. Cook, sur-
viving widow of said deceased, during her natural life, 
who is entitled to the use and enjoyment of all of the 
income therefrom- as long as she may live. 
"The following described· property included in the in-
ventory and appraisement herein for inheritance tax 
and other purposes was held in joint tenancy by said 
deceased, and is now the individual property of said 
Irene B. Cook, to-wit: 213-American Wholesale Gro-
cery Co.; stock cert. No. 8 for 18 shares, cert. No. 175 
for 40 shares, total . 58 shares. Utah Wholesale Gro-
cery Co. stock, cert. No. 860 for 111 shares. Spring-
ville Banking Co. stock, cert. No. 266 for 10 shares. 
U. S. War Savings Bonds, C33216793E-$100; C3321-
-6794E - $100; C16000163E - $100; C16988096E - $100; 
L6125490E-$50; Q21659673E-$25. 
-"Done in open court this 18th day of August, 1945. 
Joseph E. Nelson, Judge." 
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It will thus be noted that the decree specifically defines 
the property included in the estate and as referred to in 
the recitals to which appellants called attention, and in de-
tail sets out the items without any reference to the automo-
bile. 
Among other things, the court .determined in its find-
ings of fact: 
"1. That on May 24th, 1941, one Mark Cook, now de-
ceased, became the O\vner of a certain Ford sedan au-
tomobile, motor No. E-441914, referred to in plaintiff's 
complaint and defendant's answer, and that he con-
tinued the possession thereof until on or about the 
first week in May, 1943, when the possession of said 
automobile was delivered by said Mark Cook to the 
defendant, his son, and that ever since said time, the 
defendant has been in possession of said automobile 
with the knowledge of the plaintiffs, under the claim 
in good faith made by the defendant that said automo-
bile had been given to the defendant by the said Mark 
Cook as a gift, and that -defendant has since said time 
paid all taxes on said automobile; both county and 
state, out of his own funds. Whether there was in fact 
a valid gift of said automobile the court makes no find-
ing by reason of the other determinative findings which 
follow. (JR 20-21) 
"10. That during or before the month of February, 
1945, and long prior to the date of said decree, the 
plaintiffs had full knowledge of the individual claim 
of the defendant to the ownership 'of said automobile, 
and of the defendant's possession thereof pursuant to 
said claim, and that when said decree was made and 
entered, the said automobile and the facts with respect 
to defendant's claim thereto were, and had been, known 
and discovered." ( JR 24-25) 
Irene B. Cook acknowledged receipt of "all of the prop-
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erty· distributed. to me under . the decree of distribution.'' 
(JR 25, finding No. 11). 
The court further found: 
"14. ··The court further finds that notwithstanding 
their knowledge that the defendant claimed said auto-
mobile as his own personal property and possession of 
the same by virtue of said claim, neither Irene B. Cook, 
nor the plaintiffs herein, or either of them, have ever 
1nade or filed any objections or protests on account of 
the failure. ·of Mark . B. Cook as the executor aforesaid, 
or otherWiSe, to list the said automobile .involved in this 
action in the inventory and appraisement as a part of 
the estate of said Mark Cook, deceased; nor have they, 
or either of them, ·ever made or filed any objection or 
.. protest on account of. tl).e ~ailure of said Mark B~ Cook 
as the executor aforesaid, or otherwise, to list said 
automobile in his report to the Inheritance Tax Ap-
praisers or his failureto~have the same appraised there-
in; nor have the said plaintiff~ therein or said Irene B. 
· . ·cook, or either of them, ever made or filed any objec-
tion· or protest to the failure of said Mark B. Cook as 
such executor or otherwise., to list said automobile in 
his final account filed .in said estate or in the petition 
for ~final distribution of the residue of the estate of said 
deceased, nor of his fai~ure. to have. the same included 
in the decree of final distribution, nor have the plain-
tiffs ever made or filed ·any claim whatsoever, or in 
any \VJ.Y notified defendant that they claimed any in-
terest in -said automobile· until long after the time for 
appeal from the decree of final allowance of the said 
final account and from the said Jinal decree of distri-
·bution had expired in the matter of the estate of lVIark 
~Cook, deceased. 
''15. That the decree allowing and approving the final 
account of said Mark B. Cook, as the executor of the 
will of said Mark Cook, deceased, and the decree there-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
in of final distribution dated September 5th, 1945, are 
res judicata and that the plaintiffs herein are thereby 
estopped to claim any right, title or interest in said 
automobile involved in this action, to wit: that certain 
Ford sedan automobile, Motor No. E-441914. 
"16. The court further finds that for more than three 
years immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action, the defendant, Mark B. Cook, has had and held 
in good faith the open, notorious and adverse posses-
sion of the said automobile hereinabove referred to, 
and described and involved in this action, under a claim 
of individual right and with the knowledge of the plain-
tiffs of said possession and claim, and that the said 
cause of action of ·the plaintiffs herein is barred under 
and by virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of 
Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943." 
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
We believe that the findings as made by the trial court 
finally dispose of the case. We also believe, ho\vever, that . 
the court, in addition, should have found on the issue raised 
by the complaint alleging O\vnership in the plaintiffs and 
the answer denying such ownership that the plaintiffs were 
not the owners of said car, but that said car had been given 
by Mark-' Cook, defendant's father, as a gift to the defend-
ant during the fh~st week of. May, 1943,_ and that the d~ 
fendant was ever since said time, and no\V is, the owner of 
said car. 
We therefore submit in the event this court should de-
termine that the defenses of res judicata and Statute of Li-
mitations do not dispose of the case, the judgment in favor 
of the defendant should nevertheless be sustained by this 
court under the following cross-assignment: 
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1. The court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs 
were not, and never have been, the owners of the automo-
bile in question, and in failing ·to find that the plaintiff be-
came the owner of said automobile during the fi~st part of 
_May, 1943, by gift from his father and that ever since said 
time, he was, and now is, the owner of said automobile, 
which finding is required by the undisputed evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs state three main questions as being pre-
sented: 
FIRST: Does the decree of distribution distribute the 
a\ltomobile to the plaintiffs herein? 
Our position on this proposition is that not only does 
the decree of distribution fail to distribute the automobile 
to the plaintiffs, but that irrespective of the decree of dist-
ribution, the automobile was not a part of the estate of the 
deceased· and could not have been included in the decree as 
it was the property of the defendant by gift from his father. 
Under this heading, therefore, we shall answer the corres-
ponding arguments of appellants and also defendant's cross-
assignment. 
SECOND: May an executor of an estate acquire title 
to· either real or personal property of an estate or deprive 
the persons entitled to· such property of all- rights therein 
by neglecting to place the same in an inventory and ap-
praisement and otherwise failing to account therefor? 
This question as stated by appellants is in the nature 
of a straw man because it assumes that the plaintiffs are 
entitle<l. to the property, and that the property was part of 
th~. estate. We will discuss this question in relation to the 
decisions of the court which indicate that the decree of 
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distribution in this case could be attacked only for extrinsic 
fraud. We will show that the record fails to indicate ex-
trinsic fraud, that there are no pleadings raising such issue 
and that the case was not tried on any such theory. We 
will also show that the plaintiffs knew about the claims of 
defendant throughout the course of the probate proceed-
ings and intentionally chose not to contest them. Rather 
than use the phraseology of plaintiffs in discussing these 
questions, we shall discuss them under the heading, "Are 
the claims of the plaintiffs res judicata by virtue of the de-
cree and other proceedings of the probate court?" 
THIRD: May an executor by paying. taxes on the 
property of an estate which he is administering acquire title 
to such proerty by adverse possession? 
This proposition is, in a sense, another false issue,_ as it 
assumes that the automobile was property of the estate 
which he was administering, and ignores the proof not only 
that the automobile had been given to the defendant prior 
to the death of Mark Cook, but that the defendant came 
into the possession of the automobile before the death of 
the donor, before he had made any will, before the defend-
It 
ant knew of the existence of any will and long before he was 
appointed executor; and that defendant had claimed the 
automobile as his own, with the knowledge of the plaintiffs 
during all that time. Furthermore, the proposition as 
worded makes the gist of the adverse possession payment 
of taxes, while disregarding the other elements which serve 
to bar the claim. 
Therefore, the third proposition also can more properly 
be discussed under the question of "Whether the !claim of 
the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations." 
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I. The ~ree of distribution did not cover o.r distribute 
the automobile in question or any reversionary interest 
therein. 
The decree ·Of distribution did not distribute the auto-
mobile; first, because by its terms the automobile was ex-
cluded and not covered; and second, because the deceased 
during his lifetime already had made a valid gift of the au-
tomobile to the defendant. 
In plaintiffs' "Statement of the Case," it is said, "We 
are mindful that this court may not review conflicting evi-
dence and determine whether or not the automobile be-
longed to the estate at the time of the death of Mark Cook. 
However, -if the evidence is conclusive that the automobile 
belonged to the estate or if it should adopt the view ex-
pressed in ·the dissenting opinion of Jackson v. James, 97 
Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235, then and in such case, the plaintiffs · 
are entitled to a judgment for $800.00, the stipulated value 
of the automobile." We believe that in each of the premi-
ses upon which plaintiffs rely they are in error, but certain 
other inquiries should first be considered. 
We·may note in passing that the burden was upon the 
plaintiffs to shov.r ownership and conversion, and they must 
prevail, if at all, on the strength of their own title, 53 Am.' 
Jur. Sec. 176, p. 941; Jensen v. James, 50 Utah 485, 167 
Pac. 827; Jones v. Commercial Inv. Trust, 64 Utah 137, 228 
Pac. 896. On tl;le other hand, proof of actual possession of 
property or th~ performance of acts of dominion over it 
raises a presumption of ownership. 54 C. J. Sec. 243, p. 
541. 
_ Now, did the decree of distribution either actually or 
purportedly distribute the automobile to plaintiffs? 
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The plaintiffs claim through the decree of distribution 
in the Mark Cook estate on the basis of the contention that 
even though the automobile was not specifically listed in 
the report, nor in the inventory and appraisement, nor in 
the proceedings for inheritance tax, it nevertheless was 
distributed by the general provisions of the decree of dist-
ribution, as follows: 
"It is therefore hereby ordered, adjudged and de-
creed that the final account of said executor Mark B. 
Cook be and the same is hereby approved, allowed and 
settled, and that the residue of said estate of Mark 
Cook, deceased, as hereinafter particularly described, 
and any and all other property not now known or dis-
covered, which may belong to the said estate or- which 
said estate may have any interest in, and the same is 
hereby distributed in accordance with the last will and 
testament of the said decedent, ~nd as he,reinafter set 
out, to-wit:" (Emphasis added) 
(Then is described specific property, not including the auto-
mobile.) 
It seems clear from an examination of the above quoted 
provision from the decree that the court directly distributed 
the residue of the estate, "as hereinafter particularly de-
"b d " scr1 e . · . . . The automobile in question ·was not 
listed therein. 
The plaintiffs in their testimony show very clearly that 
prior to the date of this decree they had full knowledge of 
the claims of Mark B. Cook, and the court so found. 
:Ueah C. Jones, as early as February of 1945, knew of 
the claim of the defendant to the ownership of the car and 
she investigated at the State Tax Commission office in Salt 
Lake. She also knew that the defendant was using the car 
in ways inconsistent with his fiduciary duty to the estate 
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had the car belonged to it, and that he paid taxes on it 
from his own resources. 
Martha .C. Whiting knew of the defendant's use and of 
his keeping of the car, and his assertion of ownership was 
brought clearly to her attention on the 24th of July, 1944, 
\vhen the defendant refused a request to permit her son 
to drive the car to Logan. The car was known, discovered 
and discussed on all sides, and in fact plaintiffs intentionally 
refrained from ··raising any issue and from questioning the 
defendant's right. Under these facts, it cannot be said this 
property was "not known or discovered" at the time of the 
hearing of the final account. 
The final account and decree of distribution in its ma-
terial parts was read into the record (Tr 33-34) . While the 
recital of the decree referred to "other property not now 
known or discovered," the decree itself is specific as to the · 
property decreed and provides that "said property above 
referred to and hereby distributed is described as follows:" 
(Then follows the description of specific property, not in-
cluding the automobile in question; the- description neither 
directly or indirectly includes other property, whether dis-
covered or undiscovered) (Tr 34) . 
It also seems significant that in the will of Mark Cook 
and Irene B. Cook, while the plaintiffs were named as resi-
duary legatees, a large number of the items cvered by such 
residuary clause \Vere specified in the will itself, even to the 
extent of reference to "cash in any bank or banks,'' capital 
stock or various named companies, and "household furni-
ture and furnishings." It seems natural that if the auto-
mobile were owned or claimed by the decedents, or either 
of them, at the time the will was made, it would have been 
mentioned, as it was the only item of property claimed by 
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the residuary legatees which was not specified (Tr 29). 
In addition to the fact that the decree of distribution 
does not purport to cover the automobile, there is another 
reason why it was not distributed as a part of the estate 
of Mark Cook, deceased, to-wit: Because it did not belong 
to Mark Cook, the father, at the time of his death, he hav-
ing given it to the defendant in May, 1943. The automo-
bile was given by Mark Cook to the defendant the first part 
of May, and the will was made out on the ·26th day of May, 
1943 (Tr 29) . 
There can be no question as to the delivery, for ·not 
only was the car itself in the possession or defendant, but 
the certificate of title and the extra set of keys were handed 
to the defendant. A symbolical delivery alone is. sufficient, -
but here we had both. See 38 CJS, Sec. 18, p. 794; also 
Sec. 21, p. 801. 
Where the property is already in the possession of the 
donee, no change in possession is necessary to effectuate 
a gift. 38 CJS, Sec. 24, p. 803. 
It is argued by the plaintiffs that the gift to the de-
fendant of the automobile in May, 1943, was conditional, 
and the condition having been broken, the gift failed. By 
the undisputed evidence, there was a gift, and plaintiffs are 
forced to·,concede this, but they seem to rely upon the -claim 
of condition broken. There is no evidence of any broken 
or violated understanding, and on the other hand, the un-
disputed evidence is that even after the father's death, the 
defendant took ·his mother to Arizona in the car. Because 
he would not entrust the car to· the son of one of the plain-
tiffs, shows no broken condition, and could in no way af-
fect the gift; on the contrary, it brought home defendant's 
adverse position as against the plaintiffs. 
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A gift must be absolute and unconditional. Thus, a 
gift inter vivos is not effective if delivery to the donee is 
made conditional on the donor's qeath, or non-return, or in 
case anything happens to him. But the mere fact that the 
gift is accompanied by a condition or qualification not in-
consistent with the vesting of title in the donee does not ren-
der it invalid. Thus a gift on the condition that the donee 
shallgive a part of the property to a designated third per-
son is a valid gift. 28 CJ, "Gifts," Sec. 41 (H), p. 646. 
The appellants argue (p. 27 of their brief) that there 
is nothing in the evidence that Mark B. Cook accepted the 
gift. 
The acceptance of a gift, beneficial to the donee and 
otherwise complete, will be presumed unless the contrary 
is made to appear. 28 CJ, "Gifts," pp. 672; 38 CJS, p. 808. 
Not only is there such a presumption, but the evidence af-
firmatively shows, and the court found, that ever since 
the ·Change of possession in May, 1943, the defendant held 
possession under claim of right. The plaintiffs' argument 
that defendant repudiated the condition of the gift by re-
fusal to take his mother to Logan is without merit in point 
of Ia w, as has been seen above, and also in point of fact for 
the request came from one, of the plaintiffs for her son to 
drive the car, and as far as the ·record shows, this was the 
only request. His refusal to tum the car over to the son 
was a clear assertion of his right to the car, and again put 
the plaintiffs on notice thereof. 
The delivery of a gift is a matter of intent, and intent 
is to be arrived at from all the fates and circumstances of 
the case. Reed, et al, v. Knudson, et al, 80 Utah 428, 15 
P. 2d 347. 
There is nothing in the record which indicates in any 
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way that the gift was not made as testified by the defend-
ant's wife and all other facts and circumstances, including 
possession, omission from the estate with knowledge of 
plaintiffs, and exercise of dominion by defendant. Even the 
evidence relied upon by plaintiffs support the gift, for on 
the insurance, while the mother paid for the liability in-
surance "so Mark would not get into trouble," the defend-
ant reimbursed her, and he himself took out full coverage, 
including collision insurance. 
As to argument that without an endorsement by Mark 
Cook, the father, of the certificate of ownership, there 
could be no valid gift, the ease of Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 
41, 89 P. 2d 235, .seems to dispose of such contention. This 
case also cites numerous cases reflecting the Utah law of' 
gifts. The plaintiffs, in their brief, seem to hold that this 
court should now adopt the dissenting opinion in the Jack•. 
SC?n case. We submit that the majority opinion reflects the-
proper rule of law, it is fully in accord with reason and oth-
er authority, and there is no reason why it should not be 
followed in this case. 
The failure to comply with the law of signing the legal 
title and having the transfer required, does not make a 
transfer of an automobile unlaWful so as to prevent the 
equitable title to the automobile passing to the purchaser 
or donee. Mandes v. Mendes~ ·(Calif) 217 Pac. 1078; Bried-
well et al, v. Henderson, (Ore) 195 Pac. 575; Weideman v. 
Campbell, et al, 215 Pac. 885; Whitworth v. Jones, (Calif) 
209 Pac. 60; Pendell v. Thomas·, 272 Pac. 306; Sidney v. 
Wilson, 67 Cat A;pp. 282; Moody_ v. Goodwin, 53 Cal App. 
693, 200 Pac. 733; Boles v. ··stiles, (Calif) ~04 Pae. · 848; 
Votaw v. Farmers Auto Ins. Co., 85 P. 2d 872; Votaw v. 
Farmers Auto Ins. Co.,- 97 P. 2d 958, especially 962. 
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Property need not be included in the inventory which 
the decedent transferred either by gift or sale during his 
lifetime, and the title thereto does not vest in the executor 
or the heir. 33 CJS, pp. 1076, 1087. 
ll. The probate prQceedings are res judicata of plaintiffs' 
claim to the automobile. 
We perhaps should notice at the outset in this division 
the last (unnumbered) heading of plaintiffs' brief, pp. 28-
29, under which it is contended that the trial court erred 
in ·admitting in evidence the certification to the inventory 
and appraisement filed in the estate of Mark Cook. The 
resourceful but dubious argument is advanced that the ex-
hibit mentioned was testimony of transactions with the de-
ceased in contravention of .Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 104-
49-2. The plaintiffs, themselves, put in evidence the decree 
of distribution in the estate matter (Tr 30-34). Bearing 
on the question of notice of plaintiffs' claims and on what 
plaintiffs were charged with knowing, and as to the pro-
ceedings before the probate court, the inventory and ap-
praisement, together with the eertification thereof, was re-
ceived. The plaintiffs made no objection to the inventory 
and appraisement, but objected to the verification thereof 
by the executor. Such objection had no merit, because it, 
in no way, or indirectly, \Vas as to communications with 
the deceased. 1."he same coinment as was made by the court 
in Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P 2d 237, seems ap-
propriate here: "In this connection, appellant argues that 
the court erred in permitting plaintiff to testify, contend-
ing. that she was barred by the provisions of Sec. 104-49-2, 
RS of Utah, 1933. Plaintiff did not testify as to any tran-
sactions had with the deceased, or as to any conversations 
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with him, and there was consequently no error in permit-
ting her to testify as a witness." 
The objections raised bear no relationship to the evi-
dence objected to, and moreover any possible substance to 
the objection could not raise or involve any prejudice, since 
it was admitted by plaintiff that the automobile was not 
included in the inventory and in any event, since in the ab-
sence of a finding on the issue of ownership or gift, it could 
not possibly have been considered by the court as plaintiffs 
infer. In short, the inventory and appraisement being ad• 
missible, there was no reason why it should be admitted 
piecemeal. See 23 CJ, Sec. 383, pp. 1167, 1168. 
Now, passing to the principal question as to the bind ... 
ing effect of the proceedings in the probate court. 
In re: Rice's Estate, 111 Utah, 428, 182 P. 2d 111, it 
is held that a decree of distribution in probate proceedings 
after due and legal . notice by a court having jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter, is conclusive as to the fund property, 
items and matters covered by and properly included within 
the decree until set aside or modified by the ·court entering 
the decree in the manner described by law r until reversed 
on appeal. 
Cases are then cited and a referep.ce is made to Sec. 
102-11-37, UCA, 1943: 
"The settlement of the account, and the allowance 
thereof by the court, or upon appeal, is conclusive 
against all persons in any way interested in the estate, 
saving, however, to all persons laboring under any le-
gal disability their right to move for cause to reopen 
and examine the account, or to proceed by action 
against the executor or administrator either individu-
ally or upon his bond, at any time before final distri-
bution . . " 
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T~e court then says: "This section and the two quoted 
cases do not hold that a person defrauded by the acts of an 
executor or administrator is without means to correct the 
injustice. Sestion 102-14-23, UCA, 1943, sets out a reme-
dy to the person so injured. 
-" 'Mistakes in settlement may be corrected before final 
settlement and discharge, and after such time by an action 
in equity, on such showing as will justify the interference 
of the court.' 
· ''Being limited to his relief in equity, has the petitioner 
stated facts sufficient to eonstitute a cause of action against·, 
the executrix or trustee? To do this he must allege facts 
to show fraudulent acts or conduct on the part of the exec-
utrix sufficient to establish 'extrinsic fraud.'" 
On the second appeal, Rice v. Rice, Utah __ 
212 P. 2d 685, which related to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence and not wholly to the pleadings,. the court held that 
the evidence showed extrinsic fraud sufficient to authorize 
the intervention of a court of equity, while recognizing that 
, judgments must be sustained and "not for anything but 
the most compelling reasons" set aside. In the Rice cases, 
the claims of the executrix originated under the will at the 
expense of the other legatee. In the instant case the de-
fendant came into the possession and ownership of the car 
before the death of the testator. It was never a part of 
his estate, and the plaintiffs knew of defendant's claims 
prior. to the time the defendant even knew there \vas a will. 
The· defendant here made his claim in good faith with the 
l<nowledge of plaintiffs as the ,court found. The plaintiffs 
intentionally raised no issue. during the probate proceed-
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ings; they attended the hearing at which the property in 
the estate, not including the automobile, was ordered· dis-
tributed. They said or did nothing until long after the de-
cree of distribution had become final and, as a matter of 
fact, until just a short time before the commencement of 
the present action. In this action, they did not attack in 
their pleadings, or at the trial, the probate decree by an ac-
tion in equity but have brought a purely legal action for 
conversion, and the case was tried on the theory of conver-
sion. There was no fraud, overreaching or imposition. See 
also In re: Raleigh's Estate, 48 'Utah_ 138, 158 Pac. 705. 
If, under such circumstances, a probate ·decree could 
be impeached, there would be little hope of finality to any 
decree. Judgments of courts, whether in law or equity, 
should not be lightly disregarded or set aside, particularly 
when attacked collaterally. 
On page 18 of their brief, plaintiffs cite Sontag v. Su-
perior Court, 36 P. 2d 140; Walls v. Walker, 37 Cal. 424, 
99 Am. Dec. 290, and other cases in suport of the proposi-
tion that settlement of an executor"s account in the absence 
of an appeal is conclusive only as to such matte~s as were 
actually included in the account. Most of these cases in-
volve direct proceedings in the probate court itself, and il- · 
lustra te the usual remedies of proceeding for correction or _ 
supplementing of successive accounts in the same proceed~ 
ing. Thus, in Sontag ·v. Superior Court, an account was ap-
proved expressly without prejudice to the subsequent claim 
in question. None of these· cases are in point as to the case 
here. They have no application to a situation involving the-
approval of a final account and report, and a decree of final 
distribution and the acceptance of that decree by the heirs, 
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without appeal or petition to modify or correct, and a sub-
sequent collateral attack in a purely law action. 
At no place in the pleadings is it alleged by plaintiffs 
that there was any fraud, either intrinsic or extrinsic. There 
seems no pleading to invoke any inquiry as to whether the 
decree of the probate court should be set aside in the exer-
cise of any equity powers, the issues raised by the pleadings 
being: first, whether plaintiffs were the owners of the auto-
mobile; second, was there a conversion? Third, whether 
the plaintiffs' claims to the property were res judicata by 
virtue of the probate proceedings; and fourth, whether the 
claims of the plaintiffs were barred by the Statute of Limi-
tations. 
_ The plaintiffs claim that they were the owners of prop-
erty when the claimed conversion occurred, and the defend-
ant denied such ownership and proved that he was the 
owner, both by reason of a gift from his father and by rea-
son of the defenses of res judicata and the Statute of Limi-
tations._ No pleadings for the purpose of, or authorizing, 
the setting aside of the decree of the probate court were 
filed and no evidence is disclosed which would justify the 
setting aside of the probate decree even though there were 
proper pleadings before the court. 
III. The plaintiffs' claim to the automobile is barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. 
As a further defense and bar to the action alleged by 
the plaintiffs against the defendant, the defendant sets up 
Section 104-2-24 (2), UCA, 1943, which is in these words, 
so far as pertains to the matter involved here: "Within 
three years * * ~: * (2) an action for taking, de-
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taining or injuring personal property, including actions for 
specific recovery thereof.'' 
The Statute of Ui.mitations operates as a bar in equity 
as well as law. It does not operate as a rule of evidence 
by producing a presumption of payment only~ but as a posi-
tive bar. See 37 CJ, Sec. 18, p. 699. 
The same text states: 
"The general rule with respect to debts or money 
demands is that the statute of limitations are regarded 
as barring that remedy, and not as extinguishing the 
cause of action." 
Citing authorities, including re: Reiser's Estate, 57 Utah 
434, 195 Pac. 317: 
"But with respect to actions for the recoyery of 
real or personal property, the weight of authority is in 
favor of the proposition that, where one has had the 
peaceable, undisturbed, open pessession of personal, as 
well as real property, with an assertion of his owner-
ship for the period which, under the law, would bar an 
action for its recovery by the real owners, the former 
has acquired a good title-a title superior to that of 
the latter, whose neglect to avail himself of his legal 
rights has lost him his rights." -
In Nichols v. Randall, (Calif) 69 Pac. 26, the court said: 
"Statutes of Limitations have become rules of prop-
erty. They are vital to the welfare of society and are 
favored by law. They are found and approved in all 
systems of enlightened jurispnldence. They promot~ 
repose by giving stability and security to human at-
fairs. Important public policy lies at their foundation. 
They stimulate to activity and prevent negligence. 
While time is constantly destroying the evidence of 
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rights, they supply its place by presumption which ren-
-ders proof unnecessary.'' 
In Snow v. West, 35 Utah 206, 99 Pac. 674, 136 Am. St. 
Rep. 1047, it is indicated that an action for claim and de-
livery against the sheriff and judgment creditor to recover 
damages sustained by reason of alleged wrongful seizure 
and sale of property claimed to be exempt from execution 
\Vas \vithin Section 102-2-24, and the three-year Statute of 
Limitations applied. 
In the case of Dee v. Hyland, et al, 3 Utah 208, 3 Pac. 
388, which was brought for the recovery of the possession 
of a horse, or in case possession could not be had, the value 
thereof, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. 
The court held that inasmuch as the horse had been in the 
possession of the defendant and his predecessors in interest 
for more than three years, the Statute applied although 
plaintiff claimed and proved that he had no knowledge of 
the whereabouts of the horse until shortly before the action 
was commenced. 
Aside from the above mentioned principles of law, 
claims under the preceding division applies here. 
Both Leah C. Jones and Martha C. Whiting testified 
to the refusal of the defendant to permit the son of Mrs. 
Whiting to drive their mother and others to Logan on or 
about the 24th of July, 1944 and in the following February, 
the two witnesses were sufficiently concerned about the 
defendant's claims that the plaintiff, Leah C. Jones, made a 
personal investigation as to the condition of the title to the 
car. She further testified that she knew that the taxes 
were being paid by the defendant. Certainly, all were 
charged with the knowledge that in the accounts rendered 
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in the estate of Mark- Cook, deceased, there were no claims 
for taxes upon the automobile. 
The court found that the plaintiffs knew of the defend-
ant's assertion of title sometime in February of 1945. We 
think they knew of such claim long prior to this time. Tak-
ing, however, the date found by the court, we have this sit-
uation: 
The complaint in the instant action \Vas filed on May 
22nd, 1948. The three-year Statute of Limitations, begin-
ning to run before February of 1948 or before. Thus, the 
instant action was brought approximately three months 
after the expiration of the statutory period. rhe action is 
therefore further barred by reason of the Statute of Limi .. 
tations. 
Plaintiffs' argument that defendant was a trustee and 
therefore the Statute did not run in his favor ignores the 
facts that the rights and claims of defendant.originated pri-
or to the death of his father and that, as the court found 
and the undisputed evidence disclosed, the plaintiffs had 
knowledge of his adverse claims long prior to his appoint .. 
ment as executor, and in fact, before he knew there was a 
will. There never was a trust in this case as far as the 
automobile was concerned, and the authorities ·cited by 
plaintiffs are not in point. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments advanced by plaintiffs in support of 
their claim that the judgment -should be reversed are more 
dexterious than sound. There was a gift, but failure to so 
find could not be prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The failure 
of Mark Cook to endorse the title certificate is immaterial, 
but can be understood in view of the parties having· the 
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same name. This case does not involve a suit .in equity for 
the impeachment of a decree for extrinsic fraud. There is 
no such proceeding involved, and if there were, the evidence 
fails to show and fraud or overreaching, exerinsic or intrin-
si·c. The plaintiffs have had their day in court. They had 
knowledge of the rights of defendant since February, 1945, 
or before. Their present elaim is barred both by the Stat-
ute of Limitations and under the doctrine of res adjudicata. 
It is the position of defendant that the trial court was 
correct in holding that the decree settling the final report 
and account and decree of distribution in the probate case 
was res judicata; and that the trial court. was further cor-
rect in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred 
by the Statute of Limitations. If both of these holdings 
were erroneous, and only then, would the question of wheth-
er there was, in fact, a gift of the automobile to the defend-
ant in May, 1943, be material. Where a plea of res adjudi-
cata is properly sustained, the failure of the ·court to make 
specific findings on the _contentions of the plaintiff is not 
error. Torsak v. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 Pac. 367. 
If it should be determined that the court \Vere in error 
in determining the case on the issues of res judicata and the 
Statute of Limitations and that it should have made find-
ings as to the o'vnership of the property as of the time of 
the com1nencement of plaintiffs' action, it is the position of 
respondent that nevertheless, the judgment should be sus-
tained under the cross- assignment of error, as the. evidence 
shows without ·conflict thaf the automobile was given to. 
th:e defendant in May, 1943, and that he was the owner of 
said automobile at the time of the commencement of this 
action and at all times since the first part of May, 1943. 
Failure to find on an issue where th~ evidence is without 
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conflict, as we have endeavored to show is the case as to 
the issue of gift, would not justify a reversal of the judg-
ment. 
However, we submit that the court did not err in de-
ciding the case on the Statute of Limitations and the plea 
of res judicata. _ On either and both of these phases, the 
findings, conclusions and judgment finally dispose of this 
case. The claimed assignments of error of the plaintiffs 
are not well taken, and none of them are well taken. 
The judgment of the lower court in dismissing the plain-
tiffs' complaint should be affirmed, with costs to defendant 
and respondent. 
Respectfully submitted,. 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTE,NSON 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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